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Abstract
According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree
about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the the-
ory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting
a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about
observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have
argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that
the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In
addition, another set of philosophers have argued that van Fraassen’s em-
piricist position appeals to an unmotivated distinction between observable
and unobservable aspects of the world. This paper aims to reconstruct a
van Fraassen-style empiricism about scientific acceptance that avoids these
two objections – reconstructed empiricism.
1 Introduction
A popular quip has it that there are at least as many versions of scientific re-
alism as there are scientific realists and anti-realists combined. One widely-
discussed aspect of the scientific realism debate, influentially discussed in Bas
van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image (1980), concerns what kind of epistemic
attitude is involved in the acceptance of a scientific theory, where realists and
anti-realists are seen as disagreeing about whether that attitude extends to the
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unobservable entities posited by scientific theories.1 According to the realist po-
sition defined by van Fraassen, “acceptance of a scientific theory involves the
belief that it is true” (van Fraassen, 1980, 12). By contrast, van Fraassen’s own
anti-realism, constructive empiricism, holds that “acceptance of a theory involves
as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (van Fraassen, 1980, 8), where a
theory is “empirically adequate” roughly just in case it is correct in its claims
about the observable aspects of the world.2
While this conception of scientific realism and anti-realism has received its
fair share of attention, it has proven hard to get a grip on exactly what the realist
and anti-realist are meant to be disagreeing about. Indeed, some philosophers
have argued that there is no conceptual distinction between accepting a theory
and believing it to be true, and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially
settled in favor of the realist. Either way, this spells disaster for van Fraassen’s
constructive empiricism, since the position is either trivially false or part of a
debate that is itself confused. (Blackburn, 1984, 2002; Mitchell, 1988; Horwich,
1991; Teller, 2001) Another major objection to constructive empiricism is that
its reliance on the distinction between observable and unobservable entities is
unmotivated. In support of this, realists often point out that it is hard to see what
is in principle more problematic about forming beliefs concerning unobservable
entities than forming beliefs about unobserved-but-observable entities. (Railton,
1989; Rosen, 1994; Sober, 1985, 1993; Churchland, 1985; Psillos, 1996; Alspector-
Kelly, 2001; Kitcher, 2001; Ladyman, 2007)
This paper aims to reconstruct a van Fraassen-style empiricism about scien-
tific acceptance that avoids these two objections. Two things should be clear
from the outset: First, the position I will defend is not van Fraassen’s own posi-
1To be sure, van Fraassen also conceives of realism and anti-realism in terms of the aim of
science, understood as the criteria for success in the scientific enterprise. However, I shall leave
that part of the debate to one side in most of this paper, focusing instead on the part that
concerns scientific acceptance.
2This rough characterization of empirical adequacy will do for the purposes of this paper.
For a much more precise characterization, see (van Fraassen, 1980, chapter 3).
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tion. Rather, it is a somewhat more modest position that nevertheless captures
what I take to be the basic idea behind constructive empiricism, i.e. roughly
that acceptance “answers to” empirical adequacy as opposed to truth. Second,
I will not attempt to provide a positive argument for this position. Rather, I
will construct an empiricist position that avoids what I take to be the two most
serious objections to constructive empiricism. Thus I will in effect argue that one
may be a particular kind of empiricist about acceptance, not that one should be
such an empiricist.3
The plan of the paper is as follows. The first part of the paper argues for a
reconstruction of van Fraassen’s empiricist position in light of the objection that
acceptance and belief are conceptually identical. Roughly, the argument will be
that although acceptance and belief can be separated given a plausible definition
of “acceptance”, this will not be of any particular help to the empiricist since
it will mean that acceptance of a theory does not even involve the belief that
the theory is empirically adequate. (Section 2.) Accordingly, I suggest a weaker
formulation of realism and empiricism on which the issue concerns the norma-
tive connection between acceptance and belief in a theory’s empirical adequacy.
(Section 3.) When the debate has been reconstructed in this way, I argue that
an empiricist position much like van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism remains
an open possibility. (Section 4.) In the second part of the paper, I go on to
argue that the distinction between observable and unobservable entities is not
unmotivated given this conception of the debate, roughly because of the role ac-
cepted theories play in empirical predictions. (Section 5.) I thus conclude that a
reconstructed empiricist position, construed as positing a normative connection
between acceptance and belief in a theory’s empirical adequacy, avoids two of the
most serious challenges to an empiricist view of scientific acceptance. (Section
6.)
3This is in line with van Fraassen’s own defense of constructive empiricism, since van
Fraassen (1980) offers little if anything in terms of direct positive arguments for his position.
Instead, as Rosen (1994, 157-8) notes, van Fraassen’s aim seems to be to show that constructive
empiricism is a permissible stance, one that is not in conflict with the rationality of science.
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2 Distinguishing Acceptance and Belief
On van Fraassen’s conception of the scientific realism debate, the realist and the
anti-realist are both making claims about the relationship between acceptance
and belief. It is clear enough what the relationship is supposed to be: In say-
ing that acceptance involves some belief or other, the idea is that the belief in
question is necessary for acceptance. So according to van Fraassen, the realist
position can be characterized as holding that one accepts a scientific theory T
only if one believes that T is true. An anti-realist, by contrast, denies that ac-
ceptance of a theory requires that one believe that the theory is true – although
a constructive empiricist such as van Fraassen grants that a restricted belief is
required for acceptance, namely the belief that T is empirically adequate.
As things stand, however, it is unclear what concept is denoted by the term
“acceptance”, and so it is unclear what exactly the realist and the constructive
empiricist are disagreeing about. It is clear, however, that realism and empiricism
are not meant to offer stipulative definitions of “acceptance”. Rather, as Rosen
(1994, 145) points out, van Fraassen holds that acceptance is “a phenomenon
of scientific inquiry” (van Fraassen, 1980, 12) and thus something that both the
realist and empiricist can locate in scientific practice even though they disagree
about the belief involved therein. Unfortunately, however, van Fraassen never
explicitly defined “acceptance” (or “belief” for that matter), despite its central
role in his characterizations of scientific realism and constructive empiricism,
making it hard to evaluate both the empiricist view he outlines and the realist
view he rejects.
Although van Fraassen does not define “acceptance”, he makes clear that
acceptance of a theory T involves a robust commitment to T for various scientific
purposes. For example, accepting T involves relying on T in making predictions
and appealing to T in one’s explanations (van Fraassen, 1980, 12 & 151-2).4 This
4See also (van Fraassen, 2002, 90).
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has led a number of philosophers to argue that the concept of acceptance collapses
into the concept of belief (Blackburn, 1984, 2002; Melchert, 1985; Mitchell, 1988;
Horwich, 1991). Simplifying somewhat, their argument rests on the claim that to
believe a proposition just is to be disposed to behave in certain ways, which is also
what it is to accept the proposition. Similarly, Teller (2001) has argued that what
van van Fraassen (1980) calls belief is really just acceptance. On Teller’s view,
it is not acceptance that collapses into belief, but instead belief that collapses
into acceptance (Teller, 2001, 139-142). If either of these arguments is sound,
constructive empiricism (and indeed any anti-realist view of scientific acceptance)
is incoherent : One couldn’t possibly accept T without believing T , and so van
Fraassen’s antirealist position would simply be confused. Moreover, scientific
realism would be analytically true, which would no doubt come as a surprise to
many realists. No wonder Blackburn concludes that the issue of scientific realism
“has not been clearly posed”. (Blackburn, 2002, 111)
The objections of Blackburn, Melchert, Mitchell, Horwich, and Teller can
be seen as creating troubles for both realists and anti-realists about scientific
acceptance. For realists, the problem is that the realist account of the relationship
between acceptance and belief threatens to be analytically true and thus trivial.
For anti-realists such as van Fraassen, the problem is even more serious, since
their accounts would be analytically false. Thus both parties to the debate should
be motivated to find a definition of “acceptance” that does not make acceptance of
a theory conceptually identical to belief in the theory’s truth. Since van Fraassen
himself does not offer a definition, we are forced to look elsewhere. Fortunately,
several other philosophers have defined terms which are meant to be contrasted
with “belief”, and which they refer to as “acceptance”. One such definition stands
out as particularly congenial to the debate over scientific realism.5
This definition is originally due to L. Jonathan Cohen (1989, 1992), although
5For some of the other definitions of “acceptance” along the same lines, see (Alston, 1996),
(Lehrer, 1979), (Kaplan, 1981b,a, 1995), (Bratman, 1992), (Maher, 1993), (Lance, 1995), and
(Velleman, 2000).
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it has recently been applied to the realism debate about scientific acceptance
by Paul Dicken (2010). In An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Cohen defines
“acceptance,” and contrasts it with “belief”, as follows:
[...] belief that p is a disposition, when one is attending to issues
raised, or items referred to, by the proposition that p, normally to
feel it true that p and false that not-p, whether or not one is willing
to act, speak, or reason accordingly. But to accept the proposition or
rule of inference that p is to treat it as given that p. More precisely,
to accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing,
or postulating that p – i.e. of including that proposition or rule
among one’s premisses for deciding what to do or think in a particular
context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p. (Cohen, 1992,
4)
So, on Cohen’s definition, to accept a proposition is to have a policy of treat-
ing it as given in a particular context, whereas to believe something is to have
a disposition to feel it to be true. While acceptance and belief may normally
coincide on this definition, they can also come apart. For example, a defense
attorney may accept that her client is innocent in the context of her legal work
even though she does not believe it, since she may adopt a policy of treating
her client as innocent despite her feeling (perhaps strongly) that the client must
be guilty. One important difference between acceptance and belief on Cohen’s
account, emphasized by Dicken (2010, 157-167), is the extent to which they are
under our control: The lawyer may simply decide to treat it as given that her
client is innocent, whereas it will be more difficult (and perhaps even impossible)
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for her to decide to feel that this is true.6
Now, Cohen’s definition is congenial to the scientific realism debate because
there is a clear sense in which scientists who use certain theories in their scientific
work have a policy of treating those theories as given in a scientific context (much
like the lawyer has a policy of treating it as given that her client is innocent in
the context of her legal work). So, following Cohen’s definition, we can say that
for a scientist qua scientist to accept a theory T is for the scientist to have or
adopt a policy of treating T as given in a scientific context. Note that acceptance
in this sense can be both full and partial, since the corresponding policy can be
such that one treats T as given for certain scientific purposes and not others.
For example, one may treat Newtonian mechanics as given for the purposes of
making certain basic calculations even though one does not treat it as given when
calculating, say, a star’s parallax. However, unless otherwise stated, I will in this
paper be discussing full acceptance in a scientific context, i.e. the treating of a
theory as given for all scientific purposes (when the theory is applicable at all).
Thus, from now one, “acceptance” refers to full acceptance in a scientific context.7
Of course, this definition is not particularly informative unless we specify
what is involved in treating a theory as given in a scientific context. Without
attempting to provide a full characterization, it is clear that this will include
using the theory for various scientific purposes, e.g. as the basis for empirical
6That beliefs are involuntary in this way was influentially argued by Williams (1973). In
contrast to Dicken (2010, 161-167), I will not assume here, however, that beliefs are completely
involuntary – it may be possible, with effort, to induce in oneself certain beliefs in certain
circumstances. This does not eliminate the distinction between acceptance and belief with
respect to the extent to which they are under our control, since acceptance would still be
voluntary in a much more straightforward way. After all, there is no special cognitive effort
required to adopt a policy of treating propositions as given in a particular context. (See further
discussion of this point in footnote 11.)
7This might very well mean that full acceptance is relatively rare in science, since most
theories arguably involve approximations and idealizations in such a way that working scientists
would not be prepared to rely on them for all scientific purposes in which the theory is relevant
at all. Nevertheless, since van Fraassen an others participants in the debate seem to be primarily
concerned with full acceptance, it is full acceptance which I shall be concerned with here.
Besides, one could presumably give realist and anti-realist accounts of partial acceptance by
modifying the accounts of full acceptance that are discussed here (though I shall not attempt
to do so in this paper).
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predictions, as premises in one’s explanations, and as a guides in further theory
construction. This would make sense of van Fraassen’s claim that acceptance is “a
phenomenon of scientific inquiry” (van Fraassen, 1980, 12), since these activities
seem to be part and parcel of what it is to do science. It may of course be argued
that some of these activities are not really part of science (as some empiricists
have argued that explaining is not involved in doing science),8 and thus that they
are not part of the scientific context in which an accepted theory is treated as
given. However, all that is required for there to be such a thing as acceptance
in a scientific context is that there be some such scientific activities in which a
theory can be treated as given.
Now, Dicken rightly emphasizes that on a definition like Cohen’s, acceptance
and belief are “entirely distinct” attitudes in that one can accept a theory that
one does not believe to be true (Dicken, 2010, 153-157).9 Dicken is surely right
on this point. After all, accepting a theory is a matter of having a policy of using
that theory for some scientific purposes (e.g. to predict, explain, or guide theory
construction), whereas believing a theory is a matter of having a disposition to
feel it to be true. Clearly, one can lack the feeling that a particular theory is true
and yet have adopted a policy of using the theory in predictions, explanations,
guidance to theory construction, and so forth. Of course, it may well be true that
most of what one accepts one also believes to be true, but if acceptance is having
a policy for using the theory in certain contexts while belief is a disposition to
have a particular feeling towards the theory, then the two attitudes can clearly
8For example, the idealist-positivist Karl Pearson wrote in the third edition of The Grammar
of Science:
Nobody believes now that science explains anything; we all look upon it as a
shorthand description, as an economy of thought. (Pearson, 1911, xi)
Pierre Duhem seems to have advocated a similar view:
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical proposi-
tions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as sim-
ply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws. (Duhem,
1982, 19)
9As Dicken (2010, 157) points out, one can also believe a theory that one does not accept,
although this possibility will play no role in what follows.
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come apart.
However, while this distinction between acceptance and belief avoids the ob-
jection that acceptance is identical to belief (and thus make constructive em-
piricism coherent), it also raises a different but equally damning problem for
constructive empiricism. If acceptance and belief are indeed entirely distinct,
then one can accept a theory that one does not even believe to be empirically
adequate, since having a policy of using a theory for some particular purposes
clearly does not entail that one believes the theory to be empirically adequate.10
To bring this out, consider a deeply religious evolutionary biologist – Alyssa –
who uses Darwin’s theory of natural selection in her practice as a scientist, e.g.
by using it as a premise in her explanations and predictions. In other words,
Alyssa has adopted a policy of treating the theory of natural selection as given in
the context of her scientific work, and thus accepts it. However, suppose also that
because of her religious convictions, Alyssa just cannot bring herself to believe
any part of Darwin’s theory – she is psychologically unable to do so. Alyssa may
even realize that she ought to believe at least some parts of the theory, perhaps
because (she thinks) the evidence speaks overwhelmingly in its favor. Yet Alyssa
does not believe (to any degree) that the theory is even empirically adequate.
Since cases like this are clearly possible (and plausibly actual in some instances),
acceptance of a theory need not involve the belief that the theory is empirically
adequate.11
This leaves us with the following conundrum. Given the independently plausi-
10Indeed, something like this is suggested by Cohen himself in a brief mention of van
Fraassen’s views (Cohen, 1992, 89).
11It may be noted that this holds even if one accepts a strict functionalist view of belief (as
Horwich (1991) does explicitly), since the functional roles of acceptance and belief in empirical
adequacy can come apart on Cohen’s definition. To see this, imagine someone – Bertie – who
is just like Alyssa except that he believes Darwin’s theory of natural selection to be empirically
adequate in addition to accepting it. In contrast to Alyssa, Bertie will function outside of a
scientific context as someone who believes that the theory is empirically adequate. So, for
example, Bertie will normally be inclined to assert that Darwin’s theory of natural selection
makes correct prediction about observable phenomena in his day-to-day interactions outside of
a scientific context in a way that Alyssa will not be inclined to do (since she does not believe that
the theory is empirically adequate). So scientific acceptance and belief in a theory’s empirical
adequacy will clearly differ in their functional outputs.
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ble Cohen-Dicken distinction between acceptance and belief, acceptance of a the-
ory clearly does not involve believing that the theory is empirically adequate. Nor
does it involve the belief that the accepted theory is true. So, on van Fraassen’s
conception of the debate about scientific acceptance, both constructive empiri-
cism would simply be false – and the same goes for scientific realism. Instead we
would have a particularly extreme form of anti-realism, one according to which
neither kind of belief is necessary for acceptance. Clearly, then, the Cohen-Dicken
distinction by itself wouldn’t help either the realist or the empiricist to formu-
late the debate in which they mean to engage, since both positions now seem
completely wrongheaded. In particular, pace Dicken (2010, e.g. 146-148 & 210-
211), we haven’t then found a way to characterize realism and its alternatives
in a way that leaves room for a defensible empiricist position in the style of van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. The next two sections propose a way out of
this situation.
3 Realism: Reconstructing the Debate
According to van Fraassen’s conception of the realism debate, a realist thinks
there is some intimate connection between accepting a theory and believing that
the theory is true (and an empiricist thinks there is a similar connection between
Moreover, these two states will differ also in their functional inputs. This is because it
is relatively straightforward to accept at will, whereas it is more difficult, and perhaps even
impossible, to believe at will. Consider how straightforward it is to decide to adopt a policy of
using a theory in one’s scientific endeavors even if one does not find it plausible that the theory
is empirically adequate. Such a decision would be on par with deciding to adopt other policies,
e.g. to become a vegetarian or to exercise three times a week. By contrast, it would require
much more cognitive effort to make oneself believe that such a theory is empirically adequate,
i.e. to feel that the theory is empirically adequate. To induce in oneself a feeling of this sort
would seem to require some special feat that most of us are unable to perform, at least most
of the time and for most propositions. Indeed, many philosophers follow Williams (1973) in
arguing that it is impossible to have direct control over our beliefs (and that applies to beliefs
about which theories are empirically adequate just as much as it applies to beliefs about which
theories are true). At any rate, if belief is under any kind of voluntary control, it is clearly less
direct than the sort of control we have over whether we accept a theory, i.e. whether to adopt
a policy of treating the theory as given in some context. Thus it is clear that acceptance and
belief – including in particular belief in empirical adequacy – differ functionally not just with
regard to their outputs, but also with regard to their functional inputs.
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accepting a theory and believing that the theory is empirically adequate). The
upshot of the previous section is that, given the Cohen-Dicken distinction, this
connection between acceptance and belief cannot be about what kind of belief is
necessary for acceptance, since one can clearly accept a theory without believing
that it is either true or empirically adequate. However, this section argues that
the realism debate can still be understood as concerning a connection between
acceptance and belief, albeit a normative rather than necessary connection. In
this section, I thus define a type of realism about acceptance; in the next section,
I define the corresponding empiricist position about acceptance.
My suggestion is that realism about scientific acceptance should be seen as
holding that acceptance “involves” belief in the sense that it is permissible to
accept a theory in a scientific context only if it is permissible to believe that it is
true. Put differently:
(R*) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if it is permissible
to believe that T is true.12
Although (R*) is not the definition of realism about acceptance given by van
Fraassen – happily, given the problematic nature of that definition – there is a
clear sense in which it captures the kernel of truth in van Fraassen’s suggestion
that scientific realism holds that accepting a theory involves believing it to be
true. To see this, note that if accepting a theory T did involve believing that
T is true, then surely one should only accept T if believing T (which would be
involved in accepting it) is permissible.13 Given this conditional, van Fraassen’s
12A slightly weaker form of (R*) replaces “true” with “at least approximately true”. Nothing
in what follows depends on which version of (R*) one adopts, so for simplicity’s sake I shall
stick with this formulation of (R*).
13This follows from a general principle: If φ-ing involves ψ-ing, then one should only φ if it is
permissible to ψ. This principle seems to me obviously and transparently true. However, in case
you’re not convinced already, consider the following argument for it. Suppose φ-ing involves ψ-
ing. Now suppose that ψ-ing is not permissible. Then there is no permissible way to φ, because
all ways of φ-ing involve ψ-ing, which is ex hypothesi not permissible. Put differently, every
possible φ-ing is impermissible. But that is just to say that φ-ing is itself impermissible. So,
if φ-ing involves ψ-ing, then φ-ing is impermissible if ψ-ing is impermissible. This is logically
equivalent to the principle.
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conception of realism straightforwardly implies (R*). The implication does not
go the other way, however, for one could commit to the claim that one should
only accept what it’s permissible to believe is true, and yet deny in the same
voice that one’s acceptance of T entails that one believes that T is true (as is
argued above). So, in sum, (R*) is a more modest conception of realism that
nevertheless captures van Fraassen’s basic idea that realism holds that there is
some intimate connection between the acceptance of a theory and the belief that
it is true.
So (R*) is the definition of realism about scientific acceptance that I pro-
pose as a replacement of van Fraassen’s definition in light of the problems it
encountered. As we shall see in the next section, it will also allow us to define
a defensible anti-realist position in the style of van Fraassen’s constructive em-
piricism. Before I do that, however, I want to elaborate on this definition in
a few ways. First of all, note that (R*) is compatible with there being other
normative requirements on scientific acceptance besides that specified in (R*).
Thus a proponent of (R*) – a realist – may say, for example, that theories should
only be accepted if they are reasonably simple and well-managed (even if she
thinks these features are merely pragmatic as opposed to epistemic virtues of the
theory). After all, accepting very complicated or unwieldy theories may be a bad
idea from a practical standpoint, because calculations and derivations with such
theories would be unnecessarily difficult. To acknowledge such “pragmatic” re-
quirements on acceptance does not make one an anti-realist on this definition as
long as one also thinks that acceptance is governed by a normative requirement
that it be permissible to believe the accepted theory.
Second, I want to make an important point concerning permissible belief that
will allow us to reformulate (R*). According to a widespread view, sometimes
called evidentialism, a belief is permissible just in case the believed proposition
is evidentially supported. Somewhat more precisely:
(B) It is permissible to believe that p is true if and only if p’s truth is supported
by the available evidence.
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One may want to spell out (B) in various ways, e.g. by specifying whether it
applies to full beliefs and/or credences (degrees of belief), and what precisely it
is for available evidence to support the truth of a proposition. But none of that
will be important in what follows. What’s important is only that according to
(B), believing p comes with a normative requirement in terms of the evidential
support for p being true. This can be contrasted with various other attitudes
one might have towards a proposition, e.g. hoping and imagining, which clearly
do not carry with them the same normative requirement of evidential support.
Now, importantly, to say that belief is governed by the normative requirement
described in (B) should not be taken to imply that this requirement cannot be
overridden or outweighed in a particular case. In other words, (B) should be
understood as specifying a pro tanto obligation with respect to belief. To see
this, suppose someone threatens to murder your best friend unless you believe
that the earth is flat. There is clearly a sense in which believing that the earth is
flat is permissible in such a case, even though doing so would involve believing an
unjustified falsehood. Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which you have failed
as a believer if you manage to convince yourself that the earth is flat. In this
respect the norms of belief are like the rules of a game, e.g. the rule in chess that
says that the bishop should only be moved diagonally: The fact that one could
have excellent prudential or moral reasons to move one’s bishop in a different
manner does not show that the rule fails to apply in a given case. Similarly, (B)
may be overridden or outweighed in a particular case, e.g. by moral or prudential
considerations, but that does not mean that the requirement does not apply.
Although I do accept (B) thus understood, my aim is not to argue for it here.
Rather, what I want to note is that given (B), (R*) is equivalent to the claim
that one should only accept a theory if it is supported by the available evidence.
So those of us who accept (B) can define the realist thesis in terms of evidential
support as follows:
(R) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if T ’s truth is
supported by the available evidence.
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Of course, (R) should be understood in a similar way as (B), i.e. as specifying
a pro tanto obligation that may be outweighed or overruled in particular cases.
Understood in that way, there may be cases in which one should, in some natural
sense, accept a theory which isn’t supported by the available evidence – but then
only when there is a stronger or overriding non-epistemic reason to do so.
It seems to me that (R) is a more natural and informative way of stating the
realist account of scientific acceptance, given that it brings out the epistemic com-
mitment of scientific realism in a way that (R*) does not. In particular, note that
(R) stands opposed to various skeptical arguments which conclude that scientific
theories concerning observables are false or unjustified. Consider, for example,
the well-known underdetermination argument (UA), which concludes (roughly)
that it is not reasonable to believe any scientific theories about unobservables to
be true, because for any such theory there is (according to the argument) a rival
theory that is at least as well supported by one’s evidence. Why is this argument
generally considered to be a threat to scientific realism? I suggest it is at least
in part because the conclusion of UA conflicts with (R) given the claim that it
is permissible for scientists to accept their most successful theories. That is, the
following three claims form an inconsistent triad:
(i) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if T ’s truth is
supported by the available evidence. [(R)]
(ii) It is not the case that the truth of our most successful scientific theories is
supported by the available evidence. [Conclusion of UA.]
(iii) It is permissible to accept in scientific context our most successful scientific
theories.
Clearly, no genuine realist would reject (iii) (and neither would most anti-realists).
If realism is also committed to (i), as I’m suggesting, then it follows that realists
must reject (ii), the conclusion of UA. However, if realism is not committed to
(i), then it’s not clear why realists couldn’t simply embrace (ii). Of course, one
might think that rejecting (ii) is definitional of what it is to be a scientific realist,
14
but given (R) we can give a principled reason why realists must reject UA. So
(R) fits very well with the plausible thought that skeptical arguments like UA
are distinctively anti-realist arguments in a way that (R*) by itself does not.
Since (R) brings out the epistemic commitments of realism in this way, I
prefer to state the realist account of acceptance in terms of evidential support as
(R) does instead of permissible belief as (R*) does. That being said, nothing in
what follows turns crucially on this, so those who reject (B) may safely replace
(R) with (R*) in what follows and modify the discussion accordingly.
4 Reconstructed Empiricism
So far I have argued that realism about acceptance ought to be understood as
a commitment to (R), which says that one should only accept theories that are
supported by the available evidence. It follows that an anti-realist will deny (R),
i.e. claim that one may accept a theory whose truth is not supported by the
available evidence. Such rejection of (R), however, leaves open whether there is
nevertheless some other evidential requirement on accepted theories. So there
will be many ways to be an anti-realist. This section examines an anti-realist
position which, like van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, replaces the realist’s
truth with empirical adequacy.14 Indeed, since this anti-realist position is closely
related to van Fraassen’s anti-realism, it may be seen as a modest modification
of his constructive empiricism.
Now, we have already seen why, given the Cohen-Dicken distinction, accep-
tance of a theory need not involve the belief that the theory is empirically ade-
quate. However, in much the same way as realism can be redefined as positing
a normative connection between acceptance of a theory and the belief that the
theory is true, empiricism may be redefined as positing a normative connection
between acceptance of a theory and the belief that the theory is empirically ad-
14This choice will be vindicated in the next section, where the relevance of empirical adequacy
in this regard will be defended against an objection.
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equate. My suggestion is that empiricism about acceptance should be seen as
holding that it is permissible to accept a theory only if it is permissible to believe
that it is empirically adequate. Put differently:
(E*) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if it is permissible
to believe that T is empirically adequate.
Note, however, that (R*) entails (E*), so committing to (E*) does not by it-
self make one an anti-realist empiricist of the kind we are attempting to define.
Rather, this kind of anti-realist empiricism must be seen as committing to (E*)
being the whole story about what acceptability requires in terms of permissible
belief. So the redefined empiricist view – which I’ll call reconstructed empiri-
cism – commits to (E*) and rejects any stronger norm, such as (R*), relating
acceptance and belief.
Now, in the same way that (R*) captures the kernel of truth behind the realist
view of acceptance defined by van Fraassen, (E*) captures the kernel of truth in
van Fraassen’s own empiricist position. For note that if accepting a theory T
did involve believing that T is empirically adequate, then surely one should only
accept T if it is permissible to believe that T is empirically adequate. Given
this conditional, van Fraassen’s conception of realism straightforwardly implies
(E*). As before, the implication does not go the other way however, since one
could commit to the claim that one should only accept what it’s permissible
to believe is empirically adequate, and yet deny in the same voice that one’s
acceptance of T entails that one believes that T is empirically adequate. So,
in sum, reconstructed empiricism is a more modest conception of empiricism
which nevertheless captures van Fraassen’s basic idea that empiricism posits a
connection between acceptance of a theory and the belief in that it is empirically
adequate.
Indeed, it may be worth noting that (E*) is congenial to van Fraassen’s (1989;
2000; 2002; 2007) “voluntarist” epistemology, which emphasizes that rationality is
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a matter of permission rather than obligation.15 Specifically, van Fraassen holds
that “we are rational in believing something exactly when we are not rationally
compelled to believe the opposite,” which he takes to imply that “any truly
coherent position is rational” (van Fraassen, 2000, 277). Thus, for van Fraassen,
there is no single set of beliefs that an agent with some particular evidence is
obligated to adopt – rather, she is permitted to accept any coherent set of beliefs.
Since (E*) refers to what is permissible rather than obligatory for an agent to
believe, it can effortlessly accommodate this epistemic voluntarist strain in van
Fraassen’s thought.16 On the other hand, it is also worth emphasizing that this
coupling of (E*) with a van Fraassen-style voluntarist epistemology is entirely
optional. Instead of following van Fraassen in taking formal coherence to be the
only constraint on permissible beliefs, we may instead take a more traditional
route on which there are more substantive epistemic requirements as well. So
while (E*) is congenial to a voluntarist epistemology, it is also compatible with
more mainstream approaches in epistemology.17
At any rate, let us also note that given the principle (B) from the previous
section, (E*) is equivalent to the claim that one should only accept a theory T
if one’s evidence supports T ’s empirical adequacy.18 This enables us to define
reconstructed empiricism in terms of the following norm which corresponds to
the realist’s (R):
(E) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if T ’s empirical
15Van Fraassen’s voluntarist epistemology should not to be confused with the more familiar
thesis of doxastic voluntarism, which is the view that beliefs can be voluntarily adopted. The
latter is of course a thesis that we have come across earlier in this essay in discussing the
difference between acceptance and belief (see especially footnotes 6 and 11).
16I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to explore this connection
explicitly here.
17This should not be surprising, since as Psillos (2007, 135) points out, van Fraassen’s volun-
tarist view in epistemology is quite independent from his empiricist view of scientific acceptance.
18Of course, (B) refers to the truth of p and not its empirical adequacy, so one may wonder
how (B) says anything relevant to (E*). However, for our purposes, to say that T is empirically
adequate is equivalent to saying that there is a theory, call it E(T ), which holds that T is
empirically adequate. Since this theory is true just in case T is empirically adequate, (B) may
be used to derive (E) from (E*). (Another way to derive (E) from (E*) would of course be to
appeal to a modified version of (B) which replaces “truth” with “empirical adequacy”.)
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adequacy is supported by the available evidence.
(E) says, in other words, that a theory T should only be accepted if the available
evidence supports that T is correct in all its claims about the observable aspects
of the world. For analogous reasons as those concerning (R*) and (R), I prefer
to formulate reconstructed empiricism in terms of (E) instead of (E*). Thus,
from now on, I shall take reconstructed empiricism to consist in affirming (E)
and rejecting any stronger norm relating acceptance and evidential support.19
Two clarificatory points similar to those made about (R) apply to (E) as well.
First, (E) is similar to (R) and (B) in that it should be understood as positing
a pro tanto obligation that may be outweighed or overridden in particular cases,
e.g. by moral or prudential considerations. Second, and relatedly, (E) is certainly
compatible with there being other normative requirements on acceptance besides
(E), such as pragmatic requirements to accept as simple and well-managed theo-
ries as possible. Indeed, as van Fraassen notes, empiricists (and anti-realists more
generally) will tend to make more of the pragmatic aspects of acceptance due to
the fact that empirical adequacy is weaker than truth. (van Fraassen, 1980, 13)
This is true of (E) as well since pragmatic features of a theory must be appealed
to in deciding which theory to accept in a set of theories that make identical (or
equally well supported) claims about observable aspects of the world.
Where does this leave us vis-à-vis the objection that constructive empiricism
is confused in virtue of acceptance collapsing into belief (Blackburn, 1984, 2002;
Melchert, 1985; Mitchell, 1988; Horwich, 1991) or vice versa (Teller, 2001)? Well,
recall that while distinguishing acceptance and belief in the manner of Cohen
(1992) and Dicken (2010) dispels the worry that the debate is confused or trivially
settled in favor of the realist, it landed us in the awkward position of having to say
that realism and constructive empiricism are both false in virtue of the obvious
fact that it is possible to adopt a policy of using a theory for various purposes even
19As before, nothing in what follows turns crucially on this, so those who reject (B) may
safely replace (E) with (E*) in what follows and modify the discussion accordingly.
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though one does not feel that it is true. What we now see is that this difficulty
can be overcome by modifying both positions so as to concern the normative
connection between acceptance and permissible belief and/or evidential support.
Thus modified, an empiricist position – reconstructed empiricism – is not ruled
out as confused or trivially false in virtue of conceptual truths about belief and
acceptance.20
5 The Relevance of Empirical Adequacy
The previous section proposed a reconstructed empiricist position in the style of
van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, and argued that such a reconstruction
avoids the objections of Blackburn, Melchert, Mitchell, Horwich, and Teller. This
section argues for a further advantage of this way of reconstructing empiricism
about acceptance, viz. that it undergirds the relevance of the distinction be-
tween observable and unobservable entities (and the related distinction between
empirically adequate and inadequate theories). Accordingly, it serves the basis
for an empiricist reply to the objection, commonly made against constructive
empiricism, that the notions of observability and empirical adequacy are some-
how arbitrary or insignificant and that an empiricist position that relies on them
is thus unmotivated.
5.1 The Manifestationalist Challenge
A common challenge to van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism targets its re-
liance on the distinction between observable and unobservable aspects of the
world (and the related distinction between empirically adequate and inadequate
20Of course, the corresponding realist position is not ruled out either. Indeed, as advertised
in section 1, this paper contains no direct positive arguments for reconstructed empiricism as
against the corresponding realist position. However, having shown that an empiricist position
about acceptance is not (contra Blackburn, Melchert, Mitchell, Horwich, and Teller) incoherent
or confused, we can conclude that one may be an empiricist about acceptance, should one be
so inclined, and that realism about acceptance is not “the only game in town”.
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theories). Before we examine the challenge, however, let us first note that van
Fraassen himself acknowledges that the boundary between what’s observable and
unobservable is vague and relative to the epistemic community in which scientists
are working. (van Fraassen, 1980, 1985) Indeed, for van Fraassen, what’s observ-
able is itself a matter of empirical investigation, and thus there is no simple rule
for telling what counts as observable or unobservable. Yet, van Fraassen argues,
the fact that a distinction is vague, relative, and not yet fully specified does not
mean that one cannot employ it in one’s philosophical theorizing about science.
(Muller and van Fraassen, 2008; van Fraassen, 2001)
Van Fraassen may very well be correct to dismiss concerns about how and
where to draw the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. The
deeper worry in the vicinity, however, is not that the distinction cannot be co-
herently drawn, but that the significance that the empiricist attributes to it is
unmotivated. The worry, in short, is that the observability-distinction is of no
epistemic significance in science and thus cannot bear the weight that construc-
tive empiricism puts on its shoulders. In support of this, realists often point
out that it is hard to see what is in principle more problematic about forming
beliefs concerning unobservable entities than forming beliefs about unobserved-
but-observable entities. Why, for example, would it be more problematic for
scientists to confirm that there are unobservable atoms than that there is some
observable-but-as-yet-unobserved deep sea creature? More generally, it seems
that if empiricists are worried about the epistemic support one could acquire for
believing theories concerning unobservable entities, they ought to worry equally
about theories concerning unobserved-but-observable entities. (Railton, 1989;
Rosen, 1994; Sober, 1985, 1993; Churchland, 1985; Psillos, 1996; Alspector-Kelly,
2001; Kitcher, 2001; Ladyman, 2007)
This general problem may seem to undermine reconstructed empiricism just
as much as constructive empiricism, since both positions appeal to the notion
of empirical adequacy, thus relying on the distinction between observable and
unobservable aspects of the world. More specifically, the worry would be that
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any epistemic motivation for (E) in fact provides a stronger motivation for an
even weaker connection between acceptance and evidential support:
(M) A theory T should only be accepted in a scientific context if T ’s manifes-
tation adequacy is supported by the available evidence.
where a theory is “manifestationally adequate” just in case it is correct in all its
claims about what has been observed so far. (Railton, 1989) Note again that
(M) does not by itself conflict with (E) or (R), so this more extreme anti-realist
view – which I’ll call manifestationalism – must be understood as claiming that
(M) is the whole story about the normative relationship between acceptance and
evidential support, i.e. that all stronger norms of this sort are false.
The problem this poses for the reconstructed empiricist is that her position
looks to be unstable in that the epistemic modesty which is taken to motivate the
position in fact leads to an even more extreme anti-realist position, viz. manifes-
tationalism. Call this the manifestationalist challenge. Of course, this challenge
is exactly analogous to the objection made against van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism, so it may seem that reconstructed empiricism is in no better shape
than constructive empiricism in this regard. However, in what remains of this
section, I show that reconstructed empiricism has a convincing answer to the
manifestationalist challenge, roughly because of the role accepted theories play
in empirical predictions.
5.2 Empirical Adequacy and Prediction
Recall that on Cohen and Dicken’s definition, accepting a theory in a scientific
context amounts to treating that theory as given for various scientific purposes.
Now, one purpose of having scientific theories at all – emphasized in particular
by many empiricists – is to enable us to make predictions about the behavior
of the observable world, i.e. empirical predictions. (Here, “prediction” should
be understood in a broad sense that includes predictions about the the present
and the past (“retrodictions”), since scientific theories are also used to make
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predictions of this sort.) Given this, it looks to be part of what it is to accept
a scientific theory that one uses it as a basis for empirical predictions.21 More
precisely, acceptance in a scientific context involves having a policy of treating
that theory as given for the purposes of empirical predictions, so that the theory
may be called upon (often in conjunction with other theories, as the Duhem-
Quine thesis teaches us) to help us predict what we would come to observe in a
given situation (past, present, or future).
To be clear, I am not claiming that scientific acceptance involves nothing
other than having a policy of treating a theory as given in empirical predictions,
only that this is part of what acceptance involves. Plausibly, one does not accept
a theory – at least not fully – unless one is also treats it as given for other scien-
tific purposes, e.g. in explanations and in guiding further theory construction.22
It is also worth clarifying that since we are concerned with full as opposed to
partial acceptance here (see section 2), it follows that in so far as acceptance of
a theory involves having a policy of treating it as given in empirical predictions,
full acceptance involves having a policy of treating it as given in any given empir-
ical prediction. Partial acceptance, by contrast, is consistent with only treating
the theory as given for the purposes of some predictions, e.g. as Newtonian me-
chanics is often used as an approximation to General Relativity (but only when
velocities do not approach the speed of light).
So to accept a theory in a scientific context involves having a policy of taking
that theory as given for the purposes of empirical predictions. This basic point
serves as the basis for a reply on behalf of reconstructed empiricism to the man-
ifestationalist challenge posed above. To see this, note first that according to
manifestationalism one may accept a theory, and hence treat it as given for the
21A similar points was made by Nancy Cartwright in a recent sympathetic discussion of van
Fraassen’s position: “To accept a theory is to decide to use it to make all those predictions
about what we might observe that will help us chart our actions.” (Cartwright, 2007, 40)
22Here I am disagreeing with what seems to be Cartwright’s position in the quote in the
previous footnote, where she seems to suggest that acceptance of a theory involves nothing
other than using the theory to make empirical predictions.
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purposes of empirical predictions, as long as its manifestational adequacy is sup-
ported by the available evidence. However, a manifestationally adequate group
of theories may make radically incorrect empirical predictions about unobserved
phenomena – after all, manifestationally adequate theories need only be correct
about what has been observed so far. So manifestationalism implies that scien-
tists may treat a theory as given for the purposes of empirical predictions even
if they have no evidence to support that the predictions of that theory about
unobserved phenomena will be correct.
The situation is very different for reconstructed empiricism. To see this,
note that there is an intimate relationship between empirical predictions and
empirical adequacy: The empirical predictions made by a group of theories will
all be correct only if the theories in question are empirically adequate. Of course,
an empirically inadequate group of theories may make some correct empirical
predictions, but the predictions will not all be correct unless the theories are
empirically adequate. So empirical adequacy is precisely that relation between
theory and world which ensures that a given theory (or group of theories) makes
only correct empirical predictions. It follows that reconstructed empiricism’s
(E) in effect states that theories should only be accepted, and hence be treated
as given for the purposes of empirical predictions, if the correctness of those
empirical predictions is supported by the available evidence.
Manifestationalism and reconstructed empiricism thus disagree about the nor-
mative requirement on scientists qua empirical predictors. In particular, mani-
festationalist affirms, while reconstructed empiricism denies, that theories may
be treated as given in empirical predictions in science even if there is no evi-
dence which supports that its empirical predictions about unobserved phenom-
ena are correct. From the standpoint of those who take science to be, in van
Fraassen’s words, “paradigm of rational inquiry” (van Fraassen, 1994, 192), the
reconstructed empiricist’s stance on this issue is clearly preferable to manifes-
tationalism’s. From this point of view, manifestationalism cannot make sense
of the role played by accepted theories in empirical predications, since it entails
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that scientists are under no obligation whatsoever to make predictions about un-
observed phenomena whose correctness is supported by the available evidence.
Reconstructed empiricism, by contrast, can make sense of the role of accepted
theories in empirical predictions about unobserved as well as observed phenom-
ena while at the same time respecting a commitment to the rationality of science,
since it entails that scientists are obliged not to treat theories as given in empiri-
cal predictions unless they have reason to believe that the predictions in question
will be correct.
In sum, then, reconstructed empiricism can give a principled reason why
empirical adequacy – and thus observability – is relevant for acceptance, viz.
that empirical adequacy is precisely what is required of accepted theories in
order for them to make only correct empirical predictions. It is worth noting
that this motivation comes not from the observability distinction marking some
important epistemological distinction such that all and only things falling on
one side of the distinction can be supported by empirical evidence. Rather,
the relevance of the distinction comes from facts about what it is to accept a
theory in a scientific context, viz. that such acceptance involves using the theory
as a basis for empirical predictions. Thus, contrary to what is often suggested
by realists, the observability distinction is motivated not by an epistemological
principle about what can and cannot be known or reasonably believed, but rather
by the use to which theories are put in the scientific enterprise.23
23It may be worth adding that the points made in this section about the relationship between
acceptance, empirical predictions, and empirical adequacy do not also provide a rationale for the
relevance of empirical adequacy in van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. To see this, note that
even if accepting a theory involves using it in empirical predictions, which in turn are all correct
only if the theory is empirically adequate, it does not follow that any belief in the theory’s
empirical adequacy is involved in acceptance. After all, it is clearly possible to use a theory
in empirical predictions even if one does not feel it to be true that the theory is empirically
adequate. (Alyssa from section 2 is a case in point.) So even if acceptance involved using a
theory in empirical predictions, which in turn are all correct just in case the theory is empirically
adequate, it would not follow that acceptance involves belief in the theory’s empirical adequacy.
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6 Conclusion
We started with a conception of scientific realism proposed by van Fraassen
(1980), one according to which a realist holds that a belief that T is true is
necessary for acceptance of T , while an empiricist holds that only belief in T ’s
empirical adequacy is necessary for acceptance of T . However, we saw that if
we adopt a plausible story about how to distinguish between “acceptance” and
“belief” (and we need some such story on pain of trivializing the debate, as the
arguments of Blackburn, Melchert, Mitchell, Horwich, and Teller show), then it
turns out that acceptance does not require either kind of belief. Accordingly,
I suggested that realism and its competitors should be conceived of as theses
about the normative connection between acceptance and belief. In this spirit, I
proposed an empiricist view in the spirit of van Fraassen’s constructive empiri-
cism, and showed that it is immune to the objection that acceptance collapses
into belief.
Furthermore, this empiricist position turns out to enable us to make sense of
the empiricist’s emphasis on the distinction between observable and unobserv-
able entities and thus avoid what I called the manifestationalist challenge. The
observability distinction turns out to be relevant in virtue of a the role played
by accepted theories in empirical predictions, and the relationship between em-
pirical predictions and empirical adequacy. This dispels an important and in-
fluential objection to empiricist views in the scientific realism debate, viz. that
the observability distinction is arbitrary or unmotivated. I thus conclude that
a reconstructed empiricist position, construed as positing a normative connec-
tion between acceptance and empirical adequacy, avoids two of the most serious
challenges to an empiricist view of scientific acceptance.24
24I would like to thank Marc Lange, John Roberts, Matt Kotzen, and Lindsay Brainard for
very helpful comments on drafts of this paper. Versions of this paper were presented at the
University of North Carolina Work-in-Progress series in 2013, the North Carolina Philosophical
Society Annual Meeting in 2014, and the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science at the University of Helsinki in 2015. I am grateful to members of the audience on
all three occasions for their questions and comments.
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